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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by the plaintiff for breach
of an Employment Agreement.

Plaintiff alleged that defendant had

no "casue" to terminate him from his employment under the
Employment Agreement, and accordingly he was entitled to onethird (1/3) of his yearly salary as liquidated damages, pursuant
to the provisions of the Employment Agreement,

Defendant

answered by asserting that plaintiff's termination was for
"cause" due to actions by the plaintiff which were unethical
and/or were acts of moral turpitude.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND ON APPEAL

The Lower Court, in a bench trial, ruled in favor of
the plaintiff.

The case was heard by the Honorable David B. Dee,

Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah.

After oral argument before the above-entitled Court on

February 9, 1988, and pursuant to Rule 30(d) of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court, the above-entitled Court reversed the
Judgment of the Lower Court and remanded the case for entry of
Judgment in favor of the defendant.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED IN PETITION FOR REHEARING

1.

Did the Lower Court use the correct standard of

review in determining that the defendant had no factual or legal
bases to determine that plaintiff's conduct was unethical or an
act of moral turpitude?
2.

If the Lower Court did not use the correct

standard of review, did it nonetheless make Findings of Fact
sufficient to support an affirmation of the Lower Court's
Judgment on proper grounds even though different from those
relied upon by the Lower Court?
3.

If the Lower Court's Findings of Fact were not

sufficient to support a Judgment upon the correct standard of
review, then should the matter be reversed and remanded for
additional Findings of Fact or a new trial, rather than reversed
and Judgment entered for defendant?

ARGUMENT

I*

Reasoning behind Utah Supreme Court's Decision to Reverse
the Lower Court Judgment and Remand for Entry of Judgment in
Favor of Defendant.
Because the Utah Supreme Court elected to hear the

Appeal in this matter pursuant to Rule 30(d) of the Rules of the
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Utah Supreme Court, and subsequently the parties received notice
of the above-entitled Court1s decision a few days after oral
argument without an explanation of the bases of the decision,
plaintiff can only assume that, in light of the questions of the
Justices at oral argument on February 9, 1988, this Court decided
to reverse the Lower Court's Judgment because it felt that the
Lower Court had used an inappropriate standard of review of the
employment contract language, and therefore the Lower Court's
Judgment was error as a matter of law.
It is plaintiff's position that the Lower Court used
the correct standard of review in ruling in favor of the
plaintiff in the Lower Court proceeding.

However, even if the

Lower Court used the wrong standard of review, the Findings of
Fact entered by the Lower Court support Judgment for the
plaintiff under what the plaintiff assumes is this Court's
determination of the correct standard of review, or at the very
least, this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial to be
held whereby the Lower Court will be directed to utilize the
correct standard of review.
II.

The Lower Court Used the Correct Standard of Review in
Determining Whether Defendants Board of Directors had Cause
With Which to Terminate Plaintiff's Employment.
Plaintiff assumes that this Court determined that,

given the language in paragraph 1(f) of the Employment Agreement
between defendant and plaintiff, the Board of Directors of
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defendant had total discretion by which to determine whether the
conduct of the plaintiff was unethical or involved an act of
moral turpitude.

Accordingly, this Court determined that the

Lower Court should have determined whether the Board of
Directors1 discretionary judgment was made arbitrarily and
capriciously, or in bad faith and therefore contrary to the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts.
Even if the Lower Court had followed this standard of
review it would have had to find the facts as it did in the Lower
Court proceeding.

In order to determine if the judgment of the

Board of Directors was arbitrary and capricious, the Lower Court
would have to analyze the bases of the Board of Directors'
allegations of unethical conduct or acts of moral turpitude by
the plaintiff.

The Lower Court did this, and made specific

findings thereon.

Similarly, in order to determine whether the

Board acted in good faith in coming to its decision with regard
to plaintiff's conduct, the Lower Court would have to determine
whether there were any bases to the allegations made by the Board
of Directors as to plaintiff's actions.

If the Lower Court is

not entitled, under the standard of review as determined by this
Court, to review the factual underpinnings of the Board of
Directors' judgment, it has no way to determine the good faith or
capriciousness of that judgment short of hearing self-serving
testimony from the various directors of defendant regarding to
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their intentions and mental processes in coming to their decision
regarding plaintiff's conduct.
The case law extant in Utah and surrounding
jurisdictions that has dealt with interpretations of employment
contracts similar to that at issue here is limited.

Most of the

decisions concern employees of corporations or other business
entities where the contractual provisions do not discuss an
employer's discretion in determining whether its employees'
actions or omissions rise to the level of the contractuallydefined "cause."

Nonetheless, the cases that exist support a

standard of review by the Trial Court similar to that used by the
Lower Court in this action, that is, making findings of fact with
regard to the employees' actions or omissions rather than
reveiwing whether the employer's decision was arbitrary or made
in bad faith.

See, Chiodo v. General Water Works Corporation, 17

Ut.2d 425, 413 P.2d 891 (1966); Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap
and Chemical Company, Inc., 100 Idaho 785, 605 P.2d 963 (1980);
Thermo-Kinetic Corporation v. Allen, 16 Ariz. App. 341, 493 P.2d
508 (1972).
In Davis v. Tucson Arizona Boys Choir Society, 137
Ariz. 228, 669 P.2d 1005 (1983), plaintiff was the director of
the defendant.

Defendant was a non-profit corporation, just as

the defendant in the instant case is.

The contractual language,

as quoted in the opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals, is
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similar to that in the employment contract between the plaintiff
and defendant herein:
8. TERMINATION OF CONTRACT: the Society
shall have the right by and through the
action of the Board of Directors to remove
the Director for neglect of duties or
inappropriate behavior.
9. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE: in the event the
Society shall wrongfully discharge the
Director for any reason, then and in that
event, the Society shall pay to the Director
all compensation which would have been earned
by the Director from the time of wrongful
discharge until the last day of the following
June.
In the Tucson Arizona Boys Choir Society case, as in
the instant case, the Board of Directors of the defendant nonprofit corporation had the discretionary right to determine
whether the director had been neglecting his duties or had
engaged in inappropriate behavior.

The Trial Court utilized the

standard of review supported by plaintiff herein, analyzing the
bases of the "cause" by which the defendant Tucson Arizona Boys
Choir Society terminated their director.

The Trial Court found

in favor of the plaintiff and awarded liquidated damages to him
as called for under the employment contract.

On appeal the

defendant argued, similar to the questioning of this Court at
oral argument in the instant case, that the Lower Court was
limited to reviewing the good faith of the defendant's actions,
rather than whether there was a factual basis for justifying
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termination for "cause."

The Arizona Court of Appeals responded

to that argument as follows:
The contract provided that the appellee could
be discharged for neglect of duty or
inappropriate behavior. There was evidence
of discipline problems, some poor musical
performances, poor business judgment, etc.
However, as could be expected, there was a
conflict in this evidence. Whether the Board
had cause is a question of fact, and the
Trial Court implicitly found it did not. The
appellant contends that as long as it acts in
good faith it does not matter whether the
appellee had neglected his duties or had been
guilty of inappropriate behavior. The
appellant is wrong.
Davis v. Tucson Arizona Boys Choir Society, 669 P.2d at 1009-10.
In short, the Lower Court in the instant case utilized
the correct standard of review during the trial, notwithstanding
the language in the Employment Agreement that whether plaintiff
engaged in unethical acts or acts of moral turpitude was in the
judgment and determination of the Board of Directors of
defendant,

the Lower Court's decision should be affirmed.

III. Even if the Lower Court Utilized the Wrong Standard of
Review in Determining Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Action
in the Lower Court, the Findings of Fact Entered by the
Lower Court Were Sufficient to Support an Affirmation of the
Judgment Under the Correct Standard of Review.
It is well-settled in Utah that the Utah Supreme Court
can affirm a Trial Court's decision on proper grounds even though
different than those relied upon by the Trial Court.

Branch v.

Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982); Goodsel
v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974).
- 7 -

This rule was most recently affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals
in Kinsman v. Kinsman, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 110 (1988).

Even if the

proper grounds are not argued by the parties, this Court can
decide the case on the proper grounds.

Action v. Deliran, 737

P.2d 996, 999 n.4 (Utah 1987).
As noted above, even if the correct standard of review
for the Lower Court was to determine whether the Board of
Directors of defendant acted arbitrarily and capaciously or in
bad faith in determining that plaintiff engaged in unethical
conduct or acts of moral turpitude, the only way the Lower Court
could engage in such a review was by analyzing the underlying
factual allegations utilized by the Board of Directors in coming
to its determination.

The Lower Court did that, and entered

specific Findings of Fact to that end.

Accordingly, the Lower

Court's decision that plaintiff was terminated without cause was
correct, albeit possibly according to the wrong standard of
review.

This Court can affirm the Lower Court's Judgment under

the correct standard of review.
IV.

If the Lower Courtis Findings of Fact Are Not Sufficient to
Support Its Judgment Under the Correct Standard of Review.
This Matter Should be Reversed and Remanded for a New Trial.
If it is the determination of the above-entitled Court

that the Lower Court used the in correct standard of review in
coming to its judgment, and that the Lower Court's Findings of
Fact are not sufficient to support its Judgment even under the
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appropriate standard of review, the correct decision on appeal is
to reverse and remand for a new trial.

Gilbert v. City of

Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 732 P.2d 355, 364-65 (Idaho App. 1987);
Umrein v. Nelson, 70 Or. App. 104, 688 P.2d 419, 422 (1984).
This Court cannot overturn a Lower Court decision and
compel Findings of Fact in favor of the defendant unless the
evidence in the record is such that all reasonable minds must
come to that finding.

Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemical

Corporation v. Arthur G. McKee & Company, 539 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah
1975); Howarth v. Osterqaard, 30 Ut.2d 183, 515 P.2d 442, 444
(1973).

In the instant case, where the judge who presided over

the Lower Court proceeding has retired, this Court should reverse
and remand for a new trial rather than for additional findings of
fact.

Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).

Benton

v. Albuquerque National Bank, 103 N.M. 5, 701 P.2d 1025, 1033
(N.M. App 1985).

CONCLUSION

According to the case law of Utah and surrounding
jurisdictions, and in the context of the review of an employment
contract provision calling for termination for cause, the Lower
Court used the correct standard of review in finding for the
plaintiff in this matter.

Even if this Court determines that, as
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a matter of law, the Lower Court used the incorrect standard of
review, this specific Findings of Fact entered by the Lower Court
support the correct standard of review as determined by this
Court.
If it is the determination of this Court that the Lower
Court's Findings of Fact do not support the correct standard of
review, than this matter should not be reversed and remanded to
the Lower Court for entry of Judgment in favor of defendant, but
rather reversed and remanded for a new trial based upon the
proper standard of review.
Dated this 26th day of February, 1988.
TIBBALS, HOWELL, JONES & MOXLEY

Plaintiff-Respondent
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CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

I, JEFFREY R. ORITT, being duly sworn, hereby depose
and say that:

1.

I am the attorney for the plaintiff-respondent in

the above-entitled appeal.

2.

I have prepared and, on this date, submitted to

the above-entitled Court plaintiff-respondent's Petition for
Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.

3.

Pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Rules of the Utah

Supreme Court, I hereby certify that this Petition is presented
in good faith and not for delay.

There are significant points of

law and fact, as set forth in this Petition, which plaintiffrespondent feels the above-entitled Court has overlooked or
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misconstrued.

Accordingly, plaintiff-respondent's Petition for

Rehearing is hereby submitted.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to
February, 1988.

his 26th day of

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:
_L_LL
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of February, 1988
I caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition
for Rehearing of Respondent to be delivered by placing the same
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Roy G. Haslam
Thomas R. Grisley
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
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